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COLLATERAL REVIEW AND THE
INTRODUCTION
The Post Conviction Relief Act' provides a procedure for defendants to collater-
ally challenge their conviction or sentence. The Act is the sole means2 of obtaining
collateral relief and has been broadly interpreted as creating a unified statutory
framework for reviewing claims that were traditionally cognizable in habeas cor-
pus.3 The Act permits defendants in custody4 to seek relief where the conviction or
sentence resulted from one or more of the Act's specifically enumerated error or de-
fects 5 and the claimed error has not been waived 6 or previously litigated 7 on appeal
or in a previous petition under the Act. Subject to several narrow exceptions, a
petition under the Act must be filed within one year of the date the defendants's
judgment becomes final.8 This article reports on a number of recent decisions of the
Pennsylvania Supreme and Superior Court construing provisions of the Act.
REINSTATEMENT OF PCRA APPEAL RIGHTS NUNC PRO TUNC
Where counsel fails to file a direct appeal requested by the defendant, the PCRA
provides the exclusive remedy to seek reinstatement of the right to direct appeal.9
The PCRA also provides a basis for relief where the opportunity to seek discre-
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University and the author
of the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Act-Practice & Procedure (2008 ed.).
1. 42 Pa.C.S. §9541 et seq.
2. 42 Pa.C.S. §9542.
3. Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718, 721 (Pa. 1997); Commonwealth v. Chester, 733 A.2d 1242, 1250-
1251 (Pa. 1999).
4. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(1).
5. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(aO(2).
6. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543 (a)(4), 9544(b).
7. 42 Pa.C.S. §9544(a).
8. 42 Pa.C.S. §9545(b).
9. Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999). Reinstatement of direct appeal rights is not the
proper remedy where appellate counsel perfects direct appeal but fails to raise certain claims that the
defendant claims should have been raised. Where the defendant was not entirely denied his right to
direct appeal, the PCRA court should determine whether appellate counsel was ineffective in waiving
one or more issues on direct appeal. See e.g,. Commonwealth v. Grosella, 902 A.2d 1290 (Pa. 2006).
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tionary review is lost because of ineffectiveness of counsel.10 In both cases, the
defendant must file a timely post-conviction petition.1 In the context of PCRA
proceedings, a defendant has an enforceable right pursuant to Pa.R.Crim P. 904 to
effective post conviction counsel 12 in the PCRA court and on appeal from the denial
of collateral relief.13 Prior to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 2003 decision in
Commonwealth v. Robinson,14 when a defendant filed a second untimely petition
seeking to restore his right to appeal the denial of PCRA relief where the appeal had
been quashed because of counsel's failure to file a brief, the Superior Court con-
strued the untimely petition as an "extension" 15 of the timely, but previously dis-
missed first petition. Robinson rejected the "extension theory" holding that where
an appeal is taken from the denial of a timely first petition, but the Superior Court
dismisses the appeal on the basis of lawyer error,16 a second petition to restore the
defendant's right to appeal must be filed within the one-year time period under the
Act.17 The court held that ineffectiveness of counsel did not excuse an otherwise
untimely PCRA petition.18
The PCRA pro- Commonwealth v. Bennett1 9 was pending in the
vides a forum for a Superior Court when Robinson was decided. In Bennett,
the Superior Court dismissed the defendant's un-
defendant to estab- timely second petition that sought reinstatement of
lish that counsel's the right to appeal the denial of PCRA relief that was
acts or omissions lost because of lawyer error 20 on grounds that the de-
deprived him of his fendant failed to plead and prove the subsection
constitutional or (b)(1)(ii) exception 2 ' to the one-year filing period.
22 On
appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court initially con-
rule-based right to cluded that it could review whether Bennett's un-
effective counsel. timely petition met the requirements of the exception
to the one-year filing period because Bennett had re-
lied upon the process established by the Superior Court which afforded defendants
nunc pro tunc relief under the extension theory.
23
10. Commonwealth v. Liebel, 825 A.2d 630 (Pa. 2003) (where counsel fails to file a petition for allowance
of appeal after assuring the defendant he would do so, provided that counsel believes that the claims the
defendant would raise in the petition are non-frivolous, the defendant is not required to establish in the
PCRA proceeding that the Supreme Court would have granted review of the defendant's claims).
11. Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232 (Pa. 2001).
12. Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693 (Pa. 1999).
13. Pa.R.Crim.P. 904 (F)(2).
14. 837 A.2d 1157 (Pa. 2003).
15. Commonwealth v. Leasa, 759 A.2d 941 (Pa. Super. 2000); Commonwealth v. Peterson, 756 A.2d 687 (Pa.
Super. 2000).
16. Since Robinson, the Superior Court has adopted an informal practice of no longer dismissing ap-
peals without prejudice because of counsel's failure to file a brief. Instead, the court retains jurisdiction
and remands for the appointment of new counsel. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1274, n.12 (Pa.
2007).
17. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9545(b).
18. See Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214,223 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780
(Pa. 2000).
19. 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007).
20. PCRA court appointed the defendant's prior trial counsel to represent Bennett on his PCRA appeal
notwithstanding the fact that Bennett had claimed in his PCRA petition that trial counsel was ineffective.
The appeal was dismissed due to counsel's failure to file a brief.
21. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9545 (b)(1)(ii). The exception provides relief from the one-year filing period if the
defendant establishes that"the facts upon which the claim is predicted were unknown to the petitioner
and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence ......
22. Instead of alleging and proving an exception to the one-year time limitation in his PCRA petition,
the defendant relied upon the extension theory in his original and amended petitions. He first raised the
subsection (b)(1)(ii) exception in his brief before the Supreme Court.
23. The court concluded that the defendant had timely asserted the exception by filing the petition less
than twenty-five days after he learned the Superior Court had dismissed his first PCRA appeal. 930 A.2d
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Turning to the subsection (b)(1)(ii) exception to the filing period, the Bennett court
noted that it had erroneously referred to the subsection in prior decisions as the
"after-discovered evidence" exception to the one-year filing period and that it had
incorrectly engrafted Brady v. Maryland24 considerations into its analysis of the
exception. The court held that the exception "does not contain the same require-
ments as a Brady claim."25 Instead, the subsection (b)(1)(ii) exception to the one-year
filing period simply requires a defendant to allege and prove that "the facts upon
which the claim was predicated were unknown" and "could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence."26 The court held that its prior case
law27 holding that ineffectiveness of counsel could not be invoked as a newly dis-
covered"fact"for purposes of the exception does not apply when the claim of lawyer
error constitutes a "complete denial of counsel."28 Noting that the Statutory
Construction Act required it to presume that the General Assembly did not intend
to violate the United States or Pennsylvania Constitutions in enacting the PCRA, the
court held that while the PCRA is not part of the criminal process, due process
nonetheless requires that "the post conviction process be fundamentally fair."29
Application of the prior case law to situations where, as here, counsel abandons his
client on appeal would, the court held, "raise serious questions of whether the
[PCRA] process is 'fundamentally fair'.. .."30 While the court was satisfied that the
defendant had made sufficient allegations to invoke subsection (b)(1)(ii), the case
was remanded for proof that the facts were"unknown"to the defendant and that he
could not have uncovered them with the exercise of"due diligence."
In Commonwealth v. Brown,31 as in Bennett, counsel wholly abandoned his client
but in Brown, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the defendant was
not entitled to PCRA relief. Following conviction and sentence, Brown obtained new
counsel who indicated his intention to file written post-sentence motions but never
filed the motions. Eleven months after sentencing, the trial court issued an order
purporting to deny the post-sentence motions. Six days later, Brown filed a notice of
appeal which was quashed as untimely by the Superior Court a year later. Within a
year of the Superior Court's action, Brown sought PCRA relief reinstating his right
to direct appeal nunc pro tunc. In the PCRA court, the defendant did not allege and
prove an exception to the one-year time limitation and the Commonwealth did not
challenge the timeliness of the petition. Rather, it stipulated that defendant's direct
appeal counsel was ineffective in failing to file a timely post-sentence motion or no-
tice of appeal. The PCRA court reinstated the defendant's right to direct appeal but
the Superior Court quashed the appeal. The court held that the PCRA court lacked
jurisdiction to reinstate the defendant's direct appeal rights because his PCRA pe-
at 1272 n.11. In a post-Bennett case, Commonwealth v. Geer, 936 A.2d 1075 (Pa. Super. 2007), the Superior
Court held that the PCRA court did not have jurisdiction to grant the defendant's request to file an
appeal nunc pro tunc because the defendant failed to establish that he presented his claim within sixty
days of when he learned that the Superior Court had dismissed his appeal due to counsel's failure to file
an appellate brief.
24. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
25. 930 A.2d at 1271.
26. 42 Pa.C.S. §9545 (b)(1)(ii).
27. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Gamoa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 785 (Pa. 2000); Commonwealth v. Purcell, 749
A.2d 911, 916 (Pa. 2000); Commonwealth v. Crews, 863 A.2d 498 (Pa. 2004). The court noted the distinction
between cases such as the above where counsel allegedly ineffectively narrowed the claims raised on ap-
peal and where counsel abandons his client for purposes of appeal. In the later cases, the court notes,
prejudice is presumed. See Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795 (Pa. 2005); Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736
A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999).
28. 930 A.2d at 1273.
29. Id. at 1273.
30. Id. at 1274.
31. 943 A.2d 264 (Pa. 2008).
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tition was not filed within one-year of the date the judgment became final. The
Superior Court noted but did not apply the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision
in Commonwealth v. Murray32 and the Superior Court's opinion in Common-wealth v.
Mazzarone.33 In both cases, the court calculated the commencement of the one-year
filing period from the disposition of the untimely-filed notice of appeal.
In the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that by the time counsel's omission
was discovered, the one-year time period to file a PCRA petition had already
expired and urged the court to apply Murray. In affirming the Superior Court's
dismissal of the appeal, the Supreme Court stated that its language in Murray
that the one-year filing period commenced thirty days after an untimely appeal was
quashed by the Superior Court was incorrect as it conflicted with the language in
Section 9545 of the Act which provides that a judgment of sentence becomes final
"at the expiration of the time for seeking... review"where direct review is unavail-
able. Because the error in Murray was not significant to the outcome of that case, the
court concluded that the language was dictum and thus did not have the effect of
precedent. While the court acknowledged the defendant's equitable arguments,
34
the court restated that there is "no generalized equitable exception to the jurisdic-
tional one-year time bar... -35 Because the defendant did not allege and prove an
exception to the one-year filing period, he was not entitled to relief restoring his
right to direct appeal.36
In Commonwealth v. Liston,37 the Superior Court returned to the issue of the role
of the PCRA court when the defendant alleges ineffectiveness of both trial counsel
and appellate counsel in failing to file a requested direct appeal. The Superior Court
had addressed the issue in Commonwealth v. Miranda38 decided in 1982, and the
issue before the court in Liston was whether the Miranda approach remained work-
able in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Commonwealth v. Grant.
39
In Miranda, the court held that when a defendant raises multiple issues in a post-
conviction petition including a claim that counsel failed to file a timely appeal and
the post-conviction court grants the defendant the right to appeal nunc pro tunc, the
post-conviction court is required to complete the record with respect to other claims
raised in the petition, including claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel, in order for
those issues to be reviewed in the nunc pro tunc direct appeal. Liston noted that
Miranda was decided when claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel were deemed
waived unless raised by new counsel at the first opportunity, even if that first
opportunity was direct appeal and the issue had not been presented by way of post-
sentence motion to the trial court.40 In Commonwealth v. Grant4 ' this long stand-
ing rule was overruled. Grant holds that as a general rule, claims of ineffectiveness
of trial counsel would no longer be considered on direct appeal but deferred to
the post-conviction process. Liston noted that following Grant, the Pennsylvania
32. 753 A.2d 201 (Pa. 2000).
33. 856 A.2d 1208 (Pa. Super. 2004).
34. The court citing Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1273 (Pa. 2007) noted that it had recognized
the potential availability of an "as applied constitutional challenge to the application of the PCRA's time
restriction" but that the defendant had raised no such argument in the present appeal.
35. Commonwealth v. Brown, 943 A.2d at 267.
36. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Baer was of the view that the defendant was entitled to relief under
Murray. In addition, the dissent addressed"the slow erosion of rights once protected by the writ of habeas
corpus" and argued that the"PCRA simply is an inadequate device to address constructive abandonment
of counsel when it leads to complete forfeiture of direct appellate rights"and that such a claim should be
subject to review under habeas corpus. Commonwealth v. Brown, 943 A.2d at 278.
37. 941 A.2d 1279 (Pa. Super. 2008).
38. 442 A.2d 1133 (Pa. Super. 1982).
39. 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002).
40. Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 372 A.2d 687(Pa. 1977).
41. 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002).
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Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Bomar42 held that Grant did not apply when
defendant's claims of ineffectiveness were properly raised by new counsel in post-
sentence motions and the trial court heard testimony of trial counsel and addressed
the ineffectiveness claims in an opinion.43 In Liston, the court concluded that the
concerns in Miranda with respect to judicial economy and efficiency remained valid
notwithstanding Grant. Liston holds that if the PCRA court reinstates a defendant's
right to direct appeal nunc pro tunc, the PCRA court shall also reinstate the defen-
dant's right to file post-sentence motions or amended post-sentence motions nunc
pro tunc, thereby allowing the defendant to raise any issue of trial counsel ineffec-
tiveness. If such a claim is raised, the PCRA court"can hold an evidentiary hearing,
if warranted, perfect the record for review, and reach a final decision on the mer-
its."44 This procedure permits the Superior Court, consistent with Bomar, to"review
the appellant's ineffectiveness claims on the ensuing direct appeal" 4 5 thereby"pre-
serv[ing] valuable judicial time and resources, and save[ing] the appellant from
having to file another, duplicative PCRA petition raising the identical claims later in
the process."46
INEFFECTIVENESS AND THE ROLE OF STANDBY COUNSEL
It is settled law that a defendant who knowingly and intelligently waives his right
to counsel in order to exercise his right to self-representation may not later rely
upon his own ineffectiveness as grounds for a new trial.47 Less settled is whether a
defendant proceeding pro se can challenge the effectiveness of stand-by counsel.48
The claim has been recognized in a number of jurisdictions. 49 In two capital cases
decided in the 1990's, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the defendants
were not entitled to relief based upon claims of ineffectiveness of stand-by counsel
but nonetheless reviewed the claims given the irrevocable nature of the penalty.50
The issue was addressed again by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in two recent
capital cases. In contrast to the earlier cases, the Court did not review the claims of
42. 826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003).
43. In Commonwealth v. May, 887 A.2d 750 (Pa. 2005), the court concluded that the Bomar exception did
not apply where a claim of ineffectiveness was raised for the first time in the defendant's Pa.R.App.P.
1925(b) statement as the trial court had not held an evidentiary hearing at which trial counsel testified.
44. Commonwealth v. Liston, 941 A.2d at 1285.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975). See also Commonwealth v. Griffin, 644 A.2d 1167,1171
(Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Szuchon, 484 A.2d 1365, 1377 (Pa. 1984).
48. In Faretta, the Court stated that stand-by counsel could be appointed to "aid the accused if and
when the accused requests help ..."The Court also noted that a trial court could appoint stand-by coun-
sel"even over the objection of the accused..."422 U.S. at 834 n.46. See also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S.
168, 184 (1984) (appropriate for trial court to appoint"stand-by" counsel to "steer defendant through the
basic procedures of the trial".
49. See e.g. State v. Richards, 552 N.W. 2d 197 (Minn.1996) (standby counsel should be governed by some
standard of effective assistance consistent with the stand-by role); People v. Bloom, 774 P.2d 698, 718 (Cal.
1989) ("To prevail on a claim that counsel acting in an advisory or other limited capacity has rendered in-
effective assistance, a self-represented defendant must show that counsel failed to perform competently
within the limited scope of the duties assigned to or assumed by counsel .... (emphasis omitted); Ali v.
United States, 581 A.2d 368, 379-80 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (same); Downey v. People, 25 P. 3d 1200, 1204 (Colo. 2001);
State v. Thomas, 417 S.E. 2d 473,478 (N.C. 1992). See also Anne Bowen Poulin, The Role of Standby Counsel
in Criminal Cases: In the Twilight Zone of the Criminal Justice System, 75 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 676, 725-735
(2000).
50. Commonwealth v. Griffin, 644 A.2d 1167, 1171 (Pa. 1994) (adopting position of Superior Court that de-
fendant cannot challenge performance of stand-by counsel; Commonwealth v. Appel, 689 A. 2d 891, 906 (Pa.
1997). In Commonwealth v. Davis, 388 A.2d 324 (Pa. 1978), the court dismissed the defendant's claim that
stand-by was ineffective by noting that the defendant had only minimally conferred or requested advice
from stand-by counsel. See also United States v. Milolajczyk, 137 F.3rd 237, 246 (5th Cir. 1998); United States
v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82, 89-91 (2nd Cir. 1997); State v. Oliphant, 702 A.2d 1206,1212-13 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997).
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ineffectiveness of stand-by counsel. In Commonwealth v. Bryant,51 counsel repre-
sented the defendant during pre-trial proceedings but once the jury was selected,
the defendant invoked his right to self-representation and represented himself
through most of the Commonwealth's case with counsel serving as stand-by coun-
sel. Later, the defendant relinquished his right to self-representation and stand-by
counsel resumed primary representation. In an appeal from the denial of PCRA
relief, the defendant claimed stand-by counsel failed to take appropriate steps to
protect the defendant from evidentiary errors and prosecutorial misconduct and
that such failures deprived the defendant of his right to effective stand-by counsel.
In affirming the denial of PCRA relief, the Supreme Court held that once the defen-
dant waived his right to counsel and asserted his right to self-representation, he
could not"bootstrap from his own failure to raise [a] claim by blaming counsel for
failing to remedy his own mistake" 52 and consequently, the court would not "con-
sider any ineffectiveness claims that arise from the period of self-representation."
53
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Saylor faulted the majority for refusing to consider
the defendant's claim that standby counsel failed to adequately perform the limited
role assigned to him by the trial court stating that such failure"can implicate errors
of constitutional dimension."5 4
Bryant was followed in Commonwealth v. Fletcher.55 In Fletcher, the defendant
elected to proceed pro se and the court appointed standby counsel after post-verdict
motions were filed. Following the denial of post-verdict motions, new counsel was
appointed for direct appeal. After the defendant's conviction and death sentence
were affirmed on appeal, defendant asserted in a post conviction proceeding that
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call as a witness the pathologist who per-
formed the autopsy. The PCRA court granted the defendant a new trial rejecting the
Commonwealth's contention that the issue of trial counsel's ineffectiveness was
waived because the defendant proceeded pro se on post-verdict motions and failed
to raise the issue at that time or on direct appeal. In vacating the PCRA court's
order, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the defendant's self-represen-
tation at post-verdict motions "precluded future claims of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel."5 6 In a footnote, the court noted that it was following the categorical
approach it had adopted in Commonwealth v. Bryant,57 in refusing to consider any
claims of ineffectiveness arising from a period of self-representation including the
performance of stand-by counsel. 58
WITHDRAWAL BY PCRA COUNSEL
Withdrawal by counsel on direct appeal is governed by the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Anders v. California.59 Anders requires counsel seeking
to withdraw to file an advocates brief "referring to anything in the record that might
arguably support the appeal"6 0 with a copy to the defendant allowing for adequate
time for the defendant to raise any arguments he chooses. In Pennsylvania v. Finley,
61
the United States Supreme Court held that the requirements set forth in Anders are
not applicable when counsel seeks to withdraw in a post-conviction proceeding.
51. 855 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2004).
52. Id. at 740.
53. Id. at 737.
54. Id. at 752 (Saylor, J. dissenting).
55. 896 A.2d 508 (Pa. 2006).
56. 896 A.2d at 551.
57. 855 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2004).
58. 896 A.2d at 551 fn.13.
59. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
60. Id. at 744.
61. 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
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Following Finley, in Commonwealth v. Turner,62 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
established the procedure for counsel to withdraw when counsel, appointed or
retained, determines that the issues presented in the post-conviction petition are
without merit. The court held that counsel seeking to withdraw must submit, in
conjunction with a motion to withdraw, a"no-merit" letter detailing the nature and
extent of counsel's review of the issues. The"no-merit"letter shall list each issue the
defendant wishes to pursue, and an explanation of why the issue is without merit.
Turner requires that the court conduct its own independent review of the record and
agree with counsel that the petition is without merit before permitting counsel to with-
draw. The Turner procedure applies to withdrawal in the PCRA court and on appeal.
In Commonwealth v. Friend,63 the Superior Court expanded counsel's duties in
seeking to withdraw in a PCRA proceeding. Friend requires that counsel must pro-
vide the defendant notice of counsel's intent to withdraw by contemporaneously
serving the defendant with a copy of the application to withdraw, a copy of the
"no-merit" letter and a statement advising the defendant that if the court grants the
application to withdraw, the defendant may proceed pro se or with the assistance of
privately retained counsel.64
COLLATERAL REVIEW AND THE DEFINITION OF
MENTAL RETARDATION
In Adkins v. Virginia,65 the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibited the execution of mentally retarded persons. The Court left
the determination of how to apply the prohibition to the individual states. In
Commonwealth v. Miller,66 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court set out the procedure for
the resolution of an Adkins claim on collateral review. 67 The court held that the
defendant must establish mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence
using either the definition of mental retardation developed by the American
Association of Mental Retardation 68 or the definition in the Diagnostic and Statis-
tical Manual of Mental Disorders.69 These definitions require a defendant to estab-
lish limited intellectual functioning, significant adoptive limitations, and age of
onset. The court held that there was no "cutoff IQ."70 Rather, it was the "interaction
between limited intellectual functioning and deficiencies in adaptive skills that
establish mental retardation." 71 Finally, the court rejected the use of the definition
of mental retardation in the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Retardation Act 72
("MHMRA") noting that the definition in that Act "may be appropriate when the
diagnosis is for something other than penological interests."73
Reaffirming its decision in Miller in Commonwealth v. Crawley,74 the court again
rejected the MHMRA standard of mental retardation. It next turned to the level of
62. 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988).
63. 896 A.2d 607 (Pa. Super. 2006).
64. The notice requirement mandated by Friend specifically addresses due process concerns raised by
the dissent in Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 562 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
66. 888 A.2d 624 (Pa. 2005).
67. The court noted that because Miller involved the procedure for the resolution of a claim of mental
retardation on collateral review, it did not need to reach the question of whether mental retardation is to
be resolved by a judge or jury at trial.
68. Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 1 (10th ed. 2002).
69. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 1992).
70. Commonwealth v. Miller, 888 A.2d at 631.
71. Id.
72. 50 P.S. §4102.
73. Commonwealth v. Miller, 888 A.2d at 631.
74. 924 A.2d 612 (Pa. 2007).
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deference given to a PCRA's courts determination of mental retardation. The court
noted that whether a defendant meets either of the definitions adopted in Miller is
a mixed question of law and fact and that the standard for reviewing such questions
was not settled in Pennsylvania. Concluding that a highly deferential standard was
appropriate because the definition of mental retardation is fact intensive, the court
held that the standard of review is "whether the factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence and whether the legal conclusion drawn therefrom is clearly
erroneous."
75
INEFFECTIVENESS AND CAPITAL SENTENCING
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue of counsel's obligation
to investigate and present evidence of mitigation at capital sentencing in Strickland
v. Washington.76 In Strickland, the Court established a two-part performance and
prejudice standard77 that governs claims of ineffectiveness of counsel. With respect
to counsel's duty to investigate evidence of mitigation, the Court in Strickland stated
that "counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigation or to make a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary."78 Where counsel decides
as a tactical matter not to investigate or to limit the scope of investigation into
potential mitigating evidence, the decision will be "directly assessed for reason-
ableness in all the circumstances...."79
In recent cases applying Strickland, the United States Supreme Court has found
counsel ineffective at capital sentencing. In Williams v. Taylor,80 the Court concluded
that counsels' failure to discover and present mitigating evidence at sentencing
could not be justified as a tactical decision because counsel had not "fulfilled their
obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background." 81 In
Wiggins v. Smith,82 the Court concluded that counsels' decision not to expand their
investigation beyond the PSI and the defendant's social service records was not
reasonable in light of evidence in the social service records-"evidence that would
have lead a reasonably competent attorney to investigate further."83 And in Rompilla
75. Commonwealth v. Crawly, 924 A.2d at 617.
76. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
77. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defen-
dant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that deficient performance prejudiced
the defense.This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant a fair
trial, a trial whose result is unreliable." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 693. Although the test for
determining ineffectiveness is the same under both the Pennsylvania and United Sates Constitution,
Pennsylvania courts use a three-prong standard that requires the defendant to demonstrate that (1) the
issue underlying the claim of ineffectiveness has arguable merit, (2) counsel did not have a reasonable
basis for the act or omission in question, and (3) but for counsel's ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527
A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987).
78. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 695. In Strickland, the defendant claimed counsel was ineffective
in failing to request a psychiatric examination and to present evidence of the defendant's character and
emotional state. The Court disagreed finding counsel's decision not to seek additional character or psy-
chological evidence reasonable as "counsel could reasonably surmise from his conversations with re-
spondent that character and psychological evidence would be of little help"and that restricting testimony
to what had already been presented at the plea colloquy ensured that "contrary character and psycho-
logical evidence" would not come in at the sentencing hearing. Id. at 701. See also Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S.
776 (1987) (while noting that counsel could have made a more thorough investigation, counsel not inef-
fective for failure to discover and introduce evidence concerning the defendant's unstable childhood as
decision to not investigate further based upon reasonable professional judgment that such evidence may
have harmed the defendant as much as it might have helped him).
79. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).
80. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
81. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 396.
82. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
83. Id. at 534.
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v. Beard,84 the Court concluded that counsel's investigation fell below the Strickland
standard because (1) counsel failed to examine the court file on defendant's prior
conviction which counsel knew the prosecution would rely in establishing defen-
dant's history of violence; and (2) the prior conviction file contained a "range of
mitigation leads" 85 including prison files which described the defendant's "child-
hood and mental health very differently from anything defense counsel had seen or
heard"86 from other sources.
In a number of recent post-conviction appeals, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has addressed claims that capital counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate
and present mitigation evidence. In Commonwealth v. Sneed,87 the post-conviction
court granted the defendant a new penalty hearing after concluding that counsel
did not have a reasonable basis for not developing and presenting evidence of
mitigation. In affirming the PCRA court, the court found that counsel had failed to
"conduct even a cursory investigation" into defendant's background.88 Counsel had
not taken social history from the defendant or obtained defendant's prison, proba-
tion records or prior mental health evaluations. Nor did counsel have the defendant
evaluated by a mental health expert. The court found that had counsel conducted
a reasonable investigation, counsel would have discovered "significant mitigation
evidence" 89 concerning defendant's background, character and mental state. Relief
was warranted, the court concluded, because counsel's failure to investigate and de-
velop mitigation evidence was not "an objectively reasonable strategy" 90 and had
the jury heard the mitigation evidence presented at the PCRA hearing,"there is a
reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance
and voted not to impose the death penalty."91
Post-conviction relief in the form of a new penalty hearing was also granted in
Commonwealth v. Gorby.92 In Gorby, the PCRA court denied relief notwithstanding
trial counsel's testimony that"he had no strategic or tactical reason for not develop-
ing life-history, mental-health and other mitigation evidence."93 In reversing the
PCRA court, the court concluded that trial counsel "inappropriately limited his
investigation to the acquisition of rudimentary information from a narrow set of
sources". 94 The information counsel did obtain "should have prompted additional
investigation" 95 that might have lead to additional mitigation evidence. In light of
counsel's testimony, the court found "no reasonable strategy" 96 supporting coun-
sel's limited investigation. The court specifically rejected the PCRA court's sugges-
tion that granting the defendant a new sentencing hearing would indicate that in all
84. 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
85. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. at 390.
86. Id.
87. 899 A.2d 1067 (Pa. 2006).
88. Counsel did not present any testimonial evidence of mitigation at the sentencing hearing.
89. 899 A.2d at 1080.
90. In Commonwealth v. Rios, 920 A.2d 790, 812 (Pa. 2007), the court rejected the defendant's post-con-
viction claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to introduce two mental health reports and for
failing to investigate information contained in the reports regarding the defendant's mental health. The
court based its assessment of counsel's effectiveness on the testimony of counsel that he chose to limit
mental health testimony to a stipulation that the defendant had been diagnosed as schizophrenic and
that relying on the stipulation was a "strategic consideration" to put the diagnoses before the jury while
preventing the Commonwealth from using adverse information in the reports in its favor.
91. Id. at 1084
92. 900 A.2d 346 (Pa. 2006).
93. Id. at 352. The PCRA court concluded that counsel was not ineffective because counsel had spoken
at length with the defendant's mother and was not informed about any mental health problems or abuse
and that the defendant had not displayed any overt sign of a mental health problem.
94. Id. at 362
95. Id.
96. Id.
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capital cases counsel must present mental health mitigation evidence to avoid a
later finding of ineffectiveness. Relief was warranted here, the court stated, because
the"sum total of the individualized circumstances" reflected evident failures on the
part of trial counsel to provide"constitutionally effective representation at the penalty
phase of the trial ... "97
In Commonwealth v. May,98 the defendant sought PCRA relief on grounds that
appellate counsel99 were ineffective in failing to raise on appeal the trial court's
ruling that evidence of childhood abuse was not relevant mitigation evidence.10 0 In
a plurality decision, the court held that the defendant was entitled to a new sen-
tencing hearing. The court concluded that because evidence of childhood abuse is
admissible at capital sentencing and counsel did not have reasonable basis for not
presenting the issue on appeal,1 1 the defendant had satisfied the first two prongs
of the standard governing claims of ineffectiveness. With respect to prejudice, the
third prong of the standard, three members of the court concluded that because the
jury had found only one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances,
had evidence of childhood abuse been presented, there was a reasonable probabil-
ity that the jury would have reached a different result. Three other members of
the court focusing not on the jury but on the appellate court, concluded that had
the issue of the trial court's ruling barring mitigation evidence been presented on
appeal, there was a reasonable probability that the court would have remanded the
case for a new sentencing hearing.
Three additional capital cases involving claims that the counsel was ineffective
in failing to develop mitigation evidence were remanded by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to the PCRA court. In Commonwealth v. Jones,10 2 trial counsel called
no witnesses and presented no evidence at Jones' penalty hearing. The PCRA court
found that there was substantial mental health evidence and other information
available at the time of trial that should have investigated and that counsel offered
no strategic reason for failing to do so. As a result, the PCRA court concluded that
there was a "substantial likelihood that the outcome of the penalty hearing would
have been different" had the mitigation evidence been admitted. The Supreme
Court agreed that the defendant had established ineffectiveness of trial counsel but
held that a remand was necessary under Commonwealth v. McGill.10 3 As noted
above, in cases where direct appeal was filed before Commonwealth v. Grant, and
ineffectiveness of trial counsel was not presented on direct appeal, McGill holds that
the only viable post-conviction claim is one of appellate counsel ineffectiveness. A
defendant must first establish the ineffectiveness of trial counsel which satisfies the
arguable merit prong of appellate counsel's ineffectiveness. While Jones established
that trial counsel was ineffective, a remand was required to determine whether
97. Id. at 363. Direct appeal in Gorby was concluded prior to the court's decision in Commonwealth v.
Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (2002). As a result, the issue before the court was whether appellate counsel ineffec-
tive for failing to raise the issue of trial counsels' ineffectiveness. The court found no reasonable strategy
on the part of appellate counsel in failing to raise the issue of trial counsel ineffectiveness.
98. 898 A.2d 559 (Pa. 2006).
99. The defendant was represented on appeal by the same attorneys who represented him in the trial
court.
100. The defendant sought to present evidence regarding abuse by his father pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. §
9711(e)(8) which includes as mitigating evidence"[alny other evidence of mitigation concerning the char-
acter and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense."
101. Counsel testified at the PCRA hearing that he did not have a reasonable basis for the not raising
on appeal the trial court's ruling preventing the introduction of evidence of childhood abuse. Because of
this admission, other than noting the issue, the court was not required to decide whether appellate coun-
sel can forgo presenting arguably meritorious claims in favor of claims which counsel believes have a
better chance of resulting in a favorable appellate court ruling. See Commonwealth v.Jones, 815 A.2d 598,
613 (Pa .2003).
102. 912 A.2d 268 (Pa. 2006).
103. 680 A.2d 1131 (Pa. 1996).
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appellate counsel had a reasonable basis for failing to argue that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing the investigate and present mitigation evidence and whether
appellate counsel's failure to do so was prejudicial.
In Commonwealth v. Carson10 4 and Commonwealth v. Rainey,10 5 the PCRA courts
denied relief without holding an evidentiary hearing in which trial counsel testified.
In Garson, the PCRA court concluded that trial counsel had no reason to suspect the
defendant had cognitive defects and that the witnesses who testified at the penalty
hearing did not support the post-conviction claim that the defendant was raised
in an unstructured family. In remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing, the
Supreme Court stated that the "key to our evaluation of counsel's investigation is
not focused on whether counsel should have presented a mitigation case or specific
evidence, but rather questions whether the investigation supporting counsel's deci-
sion not to present a particular mitigation case or evidence was reasonable."10 6 In
Rainey, the PCRA court denied relief because the defendant had not alleged that
trial counsel was aware of his history of brain damage and psychological impair-
ments. In addition, the PCRA court "surmised"that counsel did not present mental
health mitigation evidence in an effort to keep the jury from learning that the de-
fendant was unable to control himself.The Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of
the PCRA court because trial counsel did not testify in the PCRA court and"explain
why he did not conducted an investigation."10 7 The case was remanded for an evi-
dentiary hearing to allow the defendant the opportunity to challenge the reason-
ableness of counsel's actions.
INEFFECTIVENESS AND WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL
In Commonwealth v. Mallory,10 8 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the
issue of prejudice in the context of a claim that trial counsel was ineffective because
he did not object to the trial court's failure to conduct an on-the-record oral jury
waiver pursuant to Pa.R.Crim. P. 620. In the PCRA court, the defendants testified
that although they signed written waivers, they would have exercised their right to
a jury trial if the trial court had conducted an oral colloquy. The PCRA court's grant
of a new trial was reversed by the Superior Court on grounds that the defendants
had failed to establish that the outcome of their joint trial would have been differ-
ent if it had been conducted before a jury.109 In reversing the Superior Court and
remanding the case to the PCRA court, the court held that the absence of an oral
waiver colloquy does not alone establish that the right was not knowingly and vol-
untarily waived. Rather, whether the right to a jury trial was relinquished unknow-
ingly is determined by the totality of relevant circumstance including the written
waiver, the defendant's knowledge and experience with respect to jury trials and
the off-the-record discussions with counsel. With respect to the claim that the jury
waiver was not knowing and voluntary because of counsel's ineffectiveness, the
court held that the standard is actual and not presumed prejudice. A defendant
must demonstrate"a reasonable probability that the result of the waiver proceeding
would have been different absent counsel's ineffectiveness; he does not have to
demonstrate that the outcome of a jury trial would have been more favorable than
the bench trial."110
104. 913 A.2d 220 (Pa. 2006).
105. 928 A.2d 215 (Pa. 2007).
106. Commonwealth v. Garson, 913 A.2d at 266.
107. Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d at 241.The court noted that the record was not clear with respect
to counsel's awareness of defendant's family background, mental problems and the extent to which he
obtained medical, educational or social history records.
108. 941 A.2d 686 (Pa. 2008).
109. 888 A.2d 954 (Pa. Super 2005).
110. Commonwealth v. Mallory, 941 A.2d at 702-703.
